Does high long-term orientation (LTO) as a distinctive feature of Chinese and Asian national culture still influence modern business decisions? It is difficult to answer this question when any such cultural impact must be qualified by the influence of local Chinese institutions. We study, therefore, different nationalities of international joint ventures (IJVs) within the same institutional setting of China. With foreign partners distanced from their national institutions, this isolates any cultural influence on strategies.
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For the full text of this licence, please go to: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ question, do the levels of time commitment in the strategies of Chinese firms in the twenty-first century still reflect a national culture of high LTO? An answer to this question will add to our empirical understanding of cultural influence generally, and will complement the evidence collected in China by Li et al. (2008) in relation to the choice of low/high commitment employment modes.
We first position our study within the extant literature, explaining the research gap that we intend to fill. We then go on to generate hypotheses, followed by the usual sections on Results, Discussion and Conclusions.
Long-Term Orientation and Institutions
Besides different legal, political and other institutions, business with China for westerners involves cultural distance (Tihanyi et al., 2005) , and Cross-Cultural Psychology has tried to pin down these different national characteristics by conducting attitudinal surveys.
They have revealed significant inter-country differences. For example, Hofstede (2007) reported measures for the USA (with China in parentheses) of power/distance tolerance (PDT) at 40(80), masculinity 62(66), individualism 91(20) , and uncertainty avoidance 46(40). Thus, relatively low individualism and high levels of PDT are distinctive features of Chinese culture compared with the USA.
In addition to these four familiar cultural dimensions, however, Hofstede and Bond (1988) tailored a fifth element specifically for the Asian business environment: Confucian values that included LTO, defined above. High LTO turned out to be a third distinctive feature of Chinese culture, with the USA's LTO measured to be 29, and China's 118.
LTO is arguably the most important cultural dimension through its strong association with a nation's propensity to save, invest, and thus per capita income growth (Hofstede, 2003) ; indeed, Hofstede (2001) observes that (p 351) "...long-term orientation is thus identified as a major explanation of the explosive growth of the East Asian economies in the latter part of the 20 th century." We therefore focus on LTO as a potentially important influence on firm strategies in China compared with the rest of the world.
However, the validity of Hofstede's concept of LTO is not universally accepted, and a number of alternative time-oriented constructs are available. One of the first researchers in Cross-Cultural Psychology was Hall (1959) , who focused on the tendency for individuals and organisations in a country to treat time in a "monochronic" or "polychronic" way. Monochronic societies tended to address one task at a time in a sequential manner, and this was considered to be a familiar western approach to time, with careful planning and scheduling. Polychronic societies, however, are able multi-task and are more concerned with human interaction than particular outcomes. These ideas were adapted by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) , whose concept of HumanTime Relationship introduced sequential (monochronic) and synchronic (polychronic) relations with time, adding the notion of past, present and future-oriented societies.
However, concepts turned full circle with the GLOBE project's concept of future orientation, which turned out to be very close to Hofstede's LTO, as the degree to which a collectivity encourages and rewards future-oriented behaviors such as planning and delaying gratification (Javidan and House, 2002) . Similarly, Harris and Carr (2008) have considered time orientation in terms of the timeframes within which managers intend to achieve their goals.
Despite these nuanced differences, however, different empirical measures of time orientation across countries have produced fairly stable results in broad terms (Harris and Carr, 2008) . Hofstede and Trompenaars (1997) Taking certain contradictions into account, this study feels confident in recognising broad clusters of nations revealed by the GLOBE project in relation to time orientation (Javidan and House, 2002) . For example, the USA and UK cluster exhibits short-termism, whereas there is high LTO in most Asian countries. In contrast with the attitudinal surveys of cross-cultural psychology (Hofstede, 2001; Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, 1997) and deep case analysis of perceived business objectives in relation to time (Harris and Carr, 2008) , we follow the GLOBE project (Javidan and House, 2002) and investigate the actual business practices of IJVs in China. For example, rather than enquire about the attitudes of HR managers, we focus on whether firms adopt a hire-and-fire approach to employee hirings, whether they invest in long-term training and whether they invest in arrangements such as employee pensions that cover long time periods. Without implying criticism of other approaches, our focus is on what firms do as opposed to what they believe.
While our cross-sectional study abstracted from institutional change, national institutions remain as an important potential influence, besides national culture. However, it will be argued that a cross-sectional study across different nationalities of partner absented from their home institutions means that all observations are made in the context of Chinese institutions, and variations in levels of strategic commitment may be attributed to culture.
Institutionalists (e.g. Peng, 2002) downplay intangible values, beliefs, attitudes and norms (i.e. national cultures) as influences on firms' decisions, but instead emphasize formal, tangible institutional structures that are consciously designed by humans. They feel uncomfortable with Cross-Cultural Psychology, which may be seen as national stereotyping (Adler, 2002) , and relegate national cultures to the status of mere "informal"
institutions that influence the shape of formal, deeply embedded institutions (North, 1990; Hill, 1995) . One advantage of considering both institutions and culture as useful concepts is that an important difference between them can be exploited: mental attitudes (culture) are carried along as baggage when a human migrates internationally but physical institutions must be left behind. This study makes use of this distinction.
In addition to the finding of Ralston et al., (1999) that younger Chinese managers have given different levels of importance to cultural values, Cowen (2002) reports how globalization may be destroying the international diversity of national cultures. Leung et al. (2005: 367) claim that "…cultural changes are more frequent than previously assumed", advocating (366) "…a dynamic view of culture". Finally, as noted above, Tang and Koveos (2008) note that each of Hofstede's cultural dimensions is converging over time with income growth, though institutions can hold back this curvilinear relation.
Perhaps this institutional resistance has been responsible for LTO in China and the rest of Asia remaining high.
Whether "mental programs", i.e. national cultural dimensions, are stable or subject to change is clearly an empirical question that can be addressed by repeated attitudinal surveys, though these surveys have not so far yielded resolution after forty years of tests (Triandis, 2004) . To repeat, rather than running even more attitudinal surveys or producing yet more lists of revised cultural dimensions, this paper focuses on practices not values (Javidan and House, 2002; Maseland and van Hoorn, 2009) , and specifically on a range of firm strategies, borrowing the notion of strategic commitment from the entry mode literature (Pedersen and Petersen, 1998) .
It is argued that if stable cultural elements, and specifically high LTO, continue to be an important force in Asia and modern China, as predicted by Hofstede, this will be reflected in firms' strategic decisions, mediated to some extent by organizational culture (Sirmon and Lane, 2004) . IJVs constitute a useful laboratory for addressing our research question. First, IJVs represent a recent, dynamic phenomenon, and should therefore present a strong test for Cross-Cultural Psychology's assumption of cultural stability.
Second, the nationality of IJV partners enables us to control for national institutional influence.
LTO and Firm Strategies in China
Our paper focuses on the single dimension of culture that was introduced by Hofstede and Bond (1988) Of course, Hofstede (2001: 361) argues that high LTO has a strong impact on firm behaviour: "Businesses in long-term-oriented cultures are accustomed to working toward building up strong positions in their markets; they do not expect immediate results.
Managers (often family members) are allowed time and resources to make their own contributions. In short-term cultures, the 'bottom-line' (the results of the past month, quarter or year) is a major concern; control systems are focused on it and managers are constantly judged by it." Consequently, a country's high LTO may conceivably influence firm strategies, mediated by organisational culture.
In general terms, such time orientation has been most prominent in the strategic planning literature (Das 1991; Ramaprasad and Stone, 1992) , particularly in relation to planning horizons and scenario planning in the long term (Schoemaker, 1993) . However, this temporal dimension is also relevant to corporate strategies in general, and Schneider and Barsoux (2002: 134) provide an exhaustive taxonomy of strategies that we adapted for our purposes. They distinguish between top-tier, HQ (here, parent company)-level strategies that comprise the firm's adaptation to its external environment in general. For example, parent firms may be defenders or prospectors, and may modify the firm's boundaries through mergers, acquisitions and foreign market entry, through licensing, JVs, greenfield projects, etc.
However, these external, peak-tier strategies were not our focus in the context of small
Chinese IJVs with an average of around three hundred employees in total. Instead, our focus was on internal, functional strategies (Schneider and Barsoux, 2002: 135) , i.e. marketing strategies, production strategies (internal diversification, investment, costreduction and sourcing strategies), R&D, HRM and governance strategies. In fact, investment strategy is a catch-all measure that reflects the total cost of all the firm's peak tier and functional strategies. Although some studies have already investigated the impact of dimensions of culture on single functional strategies such as internationalization (foreign market entry) or governance strategies (Brouthers, 2002; Pothukuchi et al., 2002; Salter and Niswander, 1995) , this paper examines a broader range of strategies in IJVs simultaneously. In this respect, it is not concerned with culture/performance relations in IJVs (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997 ) and therefore does not need to model IJV performance. Below, under Methods, we explain our choice of three strategies for investigation, and Table 1 explains the time dimension in relation to these strategies, with short-term/long-term examples.
Insert Table 1 , near here These strategies listed in Table 1 have all been subjected to analysis in terms of their time orientation. For example, HRM strategies have been studied (Black, 1999; Gerhart and Fang, 2005) in relation to national culture (particularly LTO) and the long term commitment in employee attitudes and management strategies. The "competing capitalisms" concept in the strategy literature (Thomas and Waring, 1999 ) is relevant in relation to R&D and general investment decisions. In this literature, highly-committed, relational investors in countries like Japan are associated with higher levels of long-term investment, mainly out of retained earnings. R&D and investment in fixed assets generally represent strategies that offer pay-back over a long gestation period compared with investment in more liquid assets, though the type of investment may be important:
for example mergers and acquisitions represent expenditures that can be completed quickly and bring immediate sales growth, while organic growth through gradual internal expansion must take longer. Of course, overseas firms may be reluctant to locate R&D in China because of weak local intellectual property protection and the likelihood of technological "spillovers" (Liu and Buck, 2007) , but there is no reason to expect these fears to vary between Asian and western IJV partners. On the other hand, we are unable to distinguish between different types of R&D, for example involving basic, long term research or the development of minor product adaptations for immediate sale (Liu and Buck, 2007) . Again this becomes a problem only if the type of time horizon for R&D varies consistently according to the nature of foreign ownership.
Thus, LTO may influence strategies, but the situation becomes more complicated within
Chinese IJVs, where the national cultures of partners are mixed with local institutional influence. To simplify matters, it seems useful to consider "clusters" of national culture (Javidan and House, 2002) . give more priority to the long term in strategic decisions.
Rather than observe a time-related concept such as LTO by developing hypotheses in relation to changes in LTO over time and testing them with longitudinal data, we propose hypotheses that focus on the possible influence on strategies of different nationalities of JV partners, with contrasting levels of LTO. In this way, we may hypothesise and test whether a Chinese culture of LTO has been strong enough to withstand foreign cultural influence.
Insert Table 2 , near here
This approach also allows us to contribute to the culture vs institutions debate. We follow
Peng (2002) who devised an ingenious study of comparisons between the practices of American and Chinese entrepreneurs in China and America. Of course these actions must reflect the national cultural and institutions of their practitioners, but China-born entrepreneurs leave behind their Chinese institutions when they move to the USA, where decisions are made within the American institutional environment. Any "Chinese"
influence on their decisions can only be cultural influence.
The first column of Table 2 shows that an IJV situated in mainland China, with local PRC ownership and management, is obviously exposed to the influence of mainland Chinese culture and institutions. Indeed, all nationalities of partner in row (2) of Table 2 may be expected to bring their cultural inheritance to bear on enterprise strategies, since mental attitudes transfer along with human migrants.
With overseas Chinese partners, however, the institutional influence from their home country cannot influence JVs in mainland China. For example, Taiwanese partners enter the PRC leaving behind their multi-party political institutions. However, some of the institutions of mainland and overseas Chinese may be similar. In the case of columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 , however, partners from the west and from other Asian countries must leave their distinctive home institutions behind. The association of different nationalities of JV partner (with different levels of LTO) with JV strategies now enables us the opportunity to develop hypotheses and contribute to the culture vs institutions debate.
With these concepts, strategies and national clusters established, the development of hypotheses derived from Cross-Cultural Psychology across all strategies is straightforward:
H1: the presence of various long term strategies within Chinese IJVs is positively associated with the degree of management control by mainland Chinese investors, via the influence of their national culture and institutions.
As explained above, however, H1 fails to distinguish between cultural and institutional influence (Child and Yuan, 1996) . For example, a long-term, high-commitment HRM strategy (the very antithesis of a short-term, "hire-and-fire" approach) in an IJV may be consistent with a culture of high LTO, but may also be explained by institutions, e.g. the presence of State or Party representatives on the boards of the Chinese parents of IJVs.
Of course, the evolution of these representatives as an institutional feature may itself reflect a national culture of high Collectivism and PDT, but speculation on their ultimate cause is futile, according to a co-evolutionary view (Lewin et al., 2004) .
Therefore, we propose that investors from Chinese communities outside the PRC (i.e.
Hong Kong, Taiwan) can only influence the strategies of their IJV through their national culture, and not through their own national institutions, which they have left behind in their homelands. This implies H2, which isolates the impact of a Chinese culture in a way that could not be achieved by studying the impact of local Although mainland China has a distinctive set of institutions founded on single party political rule, it could be argued (see Table 2 ) that there are also similarities between institutions in mainland and overseas China. As a robustness check on H2, therefore, a consideration of IJV control by non-Chinese Asians from countries with high LTO may be expected to isolate the influence of LTO, to see if it may be generalised beyond the Chinese context. Therefore, H3 addresses the cultural influence of foreign partners from other Asian countries:
H3: the presence of various long-term strategies within Chinese IJVs is positively associated with the degree of management control by foreign investors from non-Chinese
Asian countries with high levels of LTO in their national culture.
While IJV management control by partners with Asian nationality may be expected to be associated positively with long term strategies (H2, H3), the control by owners from
Western countries with low LTO may, in contrast, be expected to be associated with short-term strategies:
H4: the presence of various long-term strategies in Chinese IJVs is negatively associated with the degree of management control by foreign investors from countries with low levels of LTO in their national culture.
Thus, the problems with identifying the time-orientation of foreign managers as a key cultural influence on the strategies of an IJV are less serious with foreign control, since foreign owners and managers are removed from their own home institutional contexts in a Chinese IJV. Ironically, therefore, we go to China to measure the impact of foreign cultures, distanced from their home environment. The novelty of these hypotheses is that using the data and methods described below allows us to address our central research
question; do the strategies of Chinese firms in the twenty-first century still reflect a national culture of high LTO?

Data and Methods
Firm strategies are of course influenced by many firm, country and international variables, and we must hold many of them constant in order to identify the influence of LTO on strategies. We control for some institutional influences by basing our tests of H1- We limited the sample to high-tech industries in order to control for the impact of industrial affiliation on strategic decisions across the three nationalities of IJVs, though in addition, controls for industrial sub-sectors within the high-tech sector were used. We obtained useable responses on the three strategies, with time dimensions identified in and a willingness to participate in our survey was indicated by 2,053 JIVs, together representing 56% of the IJV population in these three cities.
The survey instrument was translated from English into Mandarin Chinese and then backtranslated by three Chinese professors in Beijing, to ensure its validity. A pilot study was carried out where two workshops were organized, involving groups of 6 and 8 senior managers of three categories of Sino-foreign IJVs. They were asked to complete the questionnaire and identify ambiguous questions. We modified the questionnaire accordingly, based on the feedback received from the workshops and copies were mailed to 2,053 IJVs.
Two well qualified and experienced research assistants in Beijing were engaged through our established research partners, the Greatwall Enterprise Institute, to conduct postal questionnaire surveys during 2006. Given the issues we were exploring, a key informant approach was adopted, with the respondent being the CEO or senior manager of the indicating no significant differences between respondent and non-respondent firms.
Hypotheses were tested for each individual strategy in Table 1 
Dependent variables.
Our focus was on the time-orientation of various IJV strategies, and it was reported above that Schneider and Barsoux (2002) proposed a long list of candidates. From these peaklevel and functional strategies, and in the interest of a questionnaire of manageable length, we had to select representative strategies for our study. It was therefore decided to focus (see Table 1 ) on investment strategy (which embraces the whole range of HQ and functional strategies), R&D strategy, which comprises adaptation to the external technological environment and straddles the HQ/local interface and HRM strategy, representing a standard functional area.
For each of these three strategic categories, we were able to identify the firm's focus on long and short term elements. For example, investments can be made in current assets, including financial assets, while other investments (e.g. in fixed assets or takeovers) reflected a longer time horizon for pay-back. For investment and R&D strategies, it was necessary to transform absolute variables by dividing by the value of sales, to correct for the influence of firm size, since larger firms are more likely to engage in local R&D, with more money to set up local R&D laboratories. We used employee tenure, the percentage of long-term contracts and the extent of pension provision as indicators of the timeorientation of HRM strategies. The proportion of R&D spending to total sales, and R&D investment contributed by parent companies, were used as an indicator of R&D strategy.
This study is only interested in the JV's R&D strategy, not its location, which is of course a bigger subject.
Independent variables.
To estimate foreign influence on the time-orientation of these IJV strategies, we used the number of foreign senior managers and Chinese senior managers on the boards of IJVs as a measure of the degree of foreign control. Three dummy variables were created for the national clusters of US-European/Chinese IJVs, Japan-Korean/Chinese IJVs, and overseas Chinese (Hong Kong-Taiwan) IJVs.
Control variables.
We controlled for firm Age in years since founding, and firm Size measured by number of employees. As the questionnaire survey was conducted in different cities, we also controlled for location by introducing two dummy variables for Tianjin and Qingdao. We also included (within high-tech) industry dummies in the estimation.
Common methods variance may be a potential problem when both dependent and independent variables are generated from the same respondents at the same time.
Common methods bias was tested by performing the single factor test proposed by Podsakoff and Organ (1986) . We conducted a factor analysis with all the variables used in our study and obtained a four-factor solution. The largest factor explained only 26.58%
of the variance. Hence, we do not have evidence of common methods bias with our dataset.
To test our hypotheses, we estimated an Ordered Probit model for HRM strategies, as the dependent variables were measured using different intervals. For example, we asked the following question: 'what is your average employee's tenure with the firm?' followed by a choice between the categories (1) '<1 year', (2) '1-3 years', (3) '4-5 years', (4) '6-10 years', and (5) 'over 10 years'. In addition, we also estimated the Tobit model, given that the dependent variable for the R&D investment strategy is censored and measured by the percentages of R&D investment in fixed assets, i.e. between 0 and 1.
Results
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis and the matrix of correlation are presented in Table 3 , and show the average age (8.5 years) and size of firms (300 employees) in our sample. Local Chinese investors, on average, account for 44% of IJV ownership across different types of IJVs. The average numbers of senior Chinese and foreign managers (of different nationalities) in each IJV are five and three.
In our tests, categories of enterprise strategy are addressed in turn, to identify any variations in time-orientation due to LTO. The three dummy variables for three types of IJVs enter the estimating equation separately in order to avoid possible multi-collinearity and differentiate the impact of different cultural clusters on firm strategies.
Insert Table 3 near here   Table 4 reports the results from the formal tests on the determinants of HRM strategy, with three categories comprising job tenure, long-term contracts and pension provision. In contrast, the results suggest that the number of US and European senior managers in US-European/Chinese IJVs has a negative association with long-term HRM strategies, as hypothesised in H4, indicating that foreign senior managers from countries with a national culture of low LTO are not willing to provide secure employee tenure, long-term contracts and pensions in Chinese IJVs. This result supports H4 in relation to HRM strategy.
Taken together, we report quite consistent evidence which suggests a link between HRM strategies and management control by investors from countries with different levels of LTO, as hypothesized in H1-4.
Insert Table 5 near here The results for investment strategies are presented in Table 5 , and it can been seen that there is again a positive link between management control by local Chinese investors and long-term investment in fixed assets in Chinese IJVs, as proposed in H1. The dummy variable for Chinese IJVs with Chinese overseas investors also has the correct sign and is significant, thus supporting H2. However, the other two dummy variables for US-EU control of Chinese IJVs, and Japan-Korea control are not statistically significant. Hence, the results for investment strategies are not consistent with H3 and H4: control by local
Chinese is associated with long-term strategies (H1), but we cannot confirm whether this is an institutional effect or the effect of the LTO of local Chinese managers.
Insert Table 6 near here The results for (long-term) R&D strategies summarised in Table 6 show a similar pattern to investment strategies. Management control by local Chinese investors positively affects long-term R&D strategy. This explanatory variable is also statistically significant for R&D investment contributed by parent companies. Thus, the result is in line with H1.
H2 is supported in terms of long-term R&D spending, given that the dummy variable of China/Hong Kong-Taiwan IJVs is positively significant, implying that overseas Chinese investors are more willing to invest in R&D. However, the dummy variable for China/Japan-Korean IJVs is again insignificant. Thus, H3 is not supported. Management control by investors from countries with low levels of LTO is also insignificant.
In terms of firms' own characteristics, the results show a positive and significant association between age, size and HRM strategies, suggesting that IJVs with a long history and large size are more likely to adopt long-term HRM strategies, perhaps because large, older firms have the resources to invest in pensions, etc. The variable for size also has a positive impact on investment and R&D strategy, despite the fact that the investment and R&D variables are represented as a proportion of sales, thus correcting for size. This result indicates that large firms are able to achieve the economies of scale that justify investment in R&D laboratories.
Discussion and Conclusion
Using firm-level primary survey data, this study first establishes that the degree of control by local Chinese partners in IJVs is associated with greater LTO across three groups of strategies, but this may be attributed to the effects of a culture of high LTO and/or local institutional influence. This result has strong implications for foreign managers. Despite references to a younger generation of Chinese managers (Ralston et al., 1999) , the evidence points towards Chinese partners with consistently longer time horizons across a range of strategies. Whether attributable to national culture, institutions or both, such cultural distance still needs to be addressed and resolved, possibly with cultural sensitivity training for foreign expatriates.
In relation to partners from beyond the PRC, however, our study also estimates the separate impact of national culture on enterprise strategies in Chinese IJVs by controlling for national institutional influence. With different nationalities of IJV partners, (i.e. US-EU, Japan-Korea and Chinese overseas investors (from Hong Kong and Taiwan), we established a link between levels of LTO in the home countries of investors and managers and the strategic decisions taken by Chinese IJVs, offering a better understanding of the impact of national cultures on enterprise strategies in IJVs. We therefore fill a gap in the literature: our results suggest that LTO has survived as a stable and influential feature of Asian societies, and western partners continue to exert a short-termist influence. They also suggest that western foreign partners can expect to find a degree of cultural distance with local Chinese partners, though partners from other Asian countries may feel more comfortable culturally.
However, the relation between strategies and LTO is not uniform. In relation to HRM strategy, we find the strongest support for the notion that management control by nationalities with high LTO continues to affect Chinese IJV strategies in China. In contrast, the results for investment and R&D strategies uniformly provide little support for our hypotheses, implying that some cultural convergence has occurred through globalization, though it should be remembered that our IJV sample was deliberately chosen to favour such a conclusion. (Leung and Kwong, 2003) .
Reflecting on the research questions posed in the Introduction to this paper, our results suggest, even in modern China, that high LTO and strategic time-horizons seem likely to represent an ongoing source of cultural distance, but only in relation to HRM strategies, supporting Li et al. (2008) . With other, more impersonal strategies, globalization may have achieved cultural convergence. In this restricted sense, Hofstede's cultural stability hypothesis survives only in relation to HRM. To this extent, however, Cross-Cultural
Psychology would appear to survive as a useful theoretical lens.
Finally, the findings from the study may inform business decisions relating to different strategies. Expatriates in Chinese IJVs may still have to accept the local influence of high LTO on strategies, if they continue to leave HRM decisions to culturally-distant local managers. The HRM strategies of IJVs need to reflect LTO in order to attract and retain local employees. Other strategies are also affected in the same way by the number of local Chinese managers on an IJV, but in this case it is not possible to distinguish the impact of culture and institutions separately. In contrast with HRM, investment and R&D strategies seem to be unaffected by the presence of an Asian or Western investor, and the message seems to be (globalized) "business as usual".
Our study has limitations. First, apart from national culture, the global/multidomestic/transnational strategies (Harzing, 2000) of partners to an IJV may be expected to influence local strategic decisions with an element of time orientation, e.g.
R&D location. However, we are unable to address associations between these strategies and the commitment level in IJVs in our cross-sectional study. Future studies should examine whether certain nationalities of foreign partners were associated with particular internationalisation strategies 1 . Second, our study mainly focuses on the stability of national culture, specifically LTO. Hence, it cannot identify the impact on levels of strategic commitment from other elements of national culture besides LTO. Future studies should account for interaction between other cultural elements and LTO. For example, LTO may be associated with high collectivism or even Self Transcendence (Meulemann, 2009) , since the interests of future generations are collectively taken into consideration where LTO is high.
Third, we address the relationship between LTO and enterprise strategies using a crosssectional analysis, estimating the cultural influence of LTO through the nationality of JV Table   Table 2 Notes: HRM1, HRM2 and HRM3 represent the variables of HRM strategies which were measured by employees' tenure, the percentage of employees' contracts for 5 years and employees' pension, respectively. R&D1 and R&D2 stand for R&D strategies, which were measured by the ratio of R&D spending to sales and the percentage of IJVs' R&D contributed by parent companies. 
